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Braly: Environmental Law

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

NORTHCOAST ENVIRONMENTAL CENTER v. GLICKMAN
136 F.3d 660 (9th Cir. 1998)

I.

INTRODUCTION

In Northcoast Environmental Center v. Glickman, I the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that
a less deferential standard of "reasonableness" applied to its
review of legal questions that determined the applicability of
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA,). 2 Thus, when
no facts are in dispute, an agency's decision not to prepare an
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)"will be upheld unless it
is unreasonable. s When facts are in dispute, however, the Supreme Court decision of Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources
Council, 4 which applied an "arbitrary and capricious" standard
of review, controls. 5

The Ninth Circuit also decided that district court had not
abused its discretion by declining to follow an exception to the
Mministrative Procedure Act (APA), 6 which allows a judge to

1. 136 F.3d 660 (9th Cir. 1998). The appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California was argued and submitted on November 6, 1997
before Judge Harlington Wood, Jr., Judge Rymer, and Judge Tashima. The opinion,
authored by Judge Wood, was filed on February 17, 1998.
2. See Northcoast Environmental Center v. Glickman, 136 F.3d 660, 667 (9th Cir.
1998). The heart of National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U .S.C. 4321 (1994),
is the requirement found at 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C), which states, "all agencies of the
Federal Government shall ... (C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other mll,jor Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of
the human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official.. .. " 42 U.S.C.
§ 4332(2)(C) (1994).
3. See Northcoast, 136 F.3d at 666.
4. 490 U.S. 360 (1989).
5. See Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. at 375-76
6. Administrative Procedure Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 105-220, 60 Stat. 237 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.). Judicial review of agency action is
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look beyond the administrative record in an appeal. 7 The district court refused to look at documents outside the record
based on a rmding that they were unnecessary and
cumulative. 8 The Ninth Circuit agreed even though Northcoast
Environmental Center's documents fit within an exception to
the APA9
II.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 1987, the United States Department of Agriculture's Forest Service (Forest Service) and the United States Department
of Interior's Bureau of Land Management (BLM) formed an
Inter-Regional Coordinating Group.l0 This group studied PortOrford Cedar (POC) trees, a valuable component of the northwestern California ecosystem, which had fallen victim to a
deadly funguS.ll The Forest Service developed a POC Action
Plan to inventory, monitor, study, and manage the POC ecosystem, and to educate the public about that ecosystem. 12 The
BLM developed Management Guidelines to supplement the
Action Plan. 13 The Management Guidelines included management objectives, implementation strategies, specifications for
equipment washing, lists of fungus control strategies and timber and service contract mitigation measures. 14 The Forest
Service's Regional Foresters approved the POC Action Plan in
June of 1988. 15
Northcoast Environmental Center (NEC), a local conservation organization working to improve and preserve environ-

generally limited to review of the administrative record. Northcoast, 136 F.3d at 665
(citing 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1998)).
7. See Northcoast, 136 F.3d at 665. The district court declined to admit exhibits
that the Northcoast Environmental Center (NEC) had offered into evidence. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See Northcoast Environmental Center v. Glickman, 136 F.3d 660, 663 (9th Cir.
1998).
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. See id. at 664.
14. See id.
15. See Northcoast, 136 F.3d at 663. The opinion does not state whether and when
the Management Guidelines were also al?proved.
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mental quality in northwestern California,16 disagreed with the
approval of the POC Action Plan!7 Initially, NEC filed a complaint with the Deputy Chief of the Forest Service, and the
Deputy Chief denied it. 18 NEC then filed a complaint in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of California seeking a temporary restraining order.19 However, NEC
voluntarily dismissed the action when the court denied its request.20

On January 5, 1995, after the Action Plan and Management
Guidelines were completed, NEC, joined by various other environmental groups, sued the Secretaries of the Departments of
Agriculture and Interior seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).21
Specifically, NEC sought to enjoin logging restrictions and road
closings within POC groves until the Secretaries completed an
EIS, as required by NEPA 22
Under NEPA, all federal agencies are required to prepare
an EIS, a detailed statement of adverse environmental impacts, for every major federal action that significantly affects

16. Biography of Northcoast Environmental Center, allailable in Westlaw, Business and Industry Information: Careers in the Law: Directories: Encyclopedia of Associations.
17. See Northcoast, 136 F.3d at 664. NEC disagreed with the approval of the POC
Action Plan because it believed that the Forest Service should have prepared an Environmental Impact Statement before the Plan was approved. See id.
18. See id. at 663.
19. See Northcoast, 136 F.3d at 663. NEC appealed the approval to the Forest
Service on August 18, 1988. See id. Almost a year later, the Regional Foresters responded with a letter to NEC. See id. The letter informally declared "the POC Action
Plan did not require an EIS because the Plan did not provide for specific actions, but
merely represented 'the beginning of a planning process. m [d. On October 20, 1988,
NEC was formally denied the appeal when the Deputy Chief of the Forest Service
wrote, "'The action plan does not represent a specific proposal with the environmental
consequences that can be meaningfully evaluated at this time. m [d.
20. See Northcoast, 136 F.3d at 663. NEC dismissed the action on March 19, 1991.
See id.
21. See id. at 664. NEC sought a declaration by the court stating that the Secretaries were required to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement for their Action
and Management Plans. See id. at 662.
22. See Northcoast, 136 F.3d at 662. NEC stated that both projects were substantially similar to other "federal, interregional disease control and timber management"
projecta for which the Forest Service and BLM had prepared EISs and, therefore, the
agencies should have prepared EISs for the current projects as well. See id. at 667.
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the quality of the human environment.23 The Government
claimed that its Action Plan and Management Guidelines did
not have significant enough effects to trigger the NEPA requirements. 24 On October 23, 1996, the district court agreed
and granted the Government's motion for summary judgment
and motion to strike NEC's exhibits.25 NEC filed an appeal to
the Ninth Circuit on November 4,1996.26
III.
A.

THE COURT'S ANALYSIS
STANDARD OF REVIEW AND NEPA APPLICABILITY

The main issue before the Ninth Circuit was whether the
inter-regional POC program, comprised of the Forest Services'
Action Plan and the BLM's Management Guidelines, constituted a major federal action requiring a programmatic EIS.27
The court fIrst examined the standard of review for appeals
from agency decisions.26 While NEC argued that the court
should select the same "reasonableness" standard as it applied
in Friends of the Earth v. Hintz,29 the Government contended
that the "arbitrary and capricious standard" used by the Supreme Court in Marsh was the appropriate test. 30

23. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1994).
24. See Northcoast, 136 F.3d at 667. aIn support, the Secretaries assert that these
[projects) are merely 'research, development, and information-gathering tool[s) intended to lay the groundwork for later decision making.... ld.
25. See id. at 664.
26. See id.
27. See Northcoast Environmental Center v. Glickman, 136 F.3d 660, 665 (9th Cir.
1998).
28. See id. at 666.
29. 800 F.2d 822 (9th Cir. 1986). In Friends, environmental groups filed a suit
against the District Engineer of the Army Corps of Engineers for issuing a permit
authorizing a logging company to discharge fill material into a wetland area. See
Friends of the Earth v. Hintz, 800 F .2d at 826-827. The district court upheld the permit issuance and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. See id. at 828, 839. The Ninth Circuit
also upheld the Corps' decision to not prepare an EIS based on its finding that aan
agency's decision that a particular project does not require preparation of an EIS is to
be upheld unless it is unreasonable." ld. at 836. Given the extensive administrative
record and considerations taken, the court felt the Corps' decision was reasonable. See
id. at 838.
30. See Northcoast, 136 F.3d at 666 (citing Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources
Council, 490 u.S. 360 (1989». In Marsh, a group of nonprofit organizations sued the
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IDtimately, the Ninth Circuit held the "reasonableness"
standard to be the proper standard of review. 31 In doing so, the
court examined Marsh and the subsequent split in the circuits
regarding Marsh's breadth. 32 In Marsh, a unanimous Supreme
Court, held "that substantive NEPA decisions by an agency are
reviewed under the arbitrary and capricious standard."33 This
standard of review examines whether the agency considered all
the relevant factors, articulated a rational connection between
the facts found and the choice made, and whether the agency
committed a clear error of judgment.34
Subsequent circuit courts, however, have both limited and
broadened Marsh's ruling.35 The Eleventh Circuit read Marsh
broadly, applying it to all agency actions involving NEPA 36
The Eighth and Tenth Circuits, on the other hand, limited
Marsh by determining that Marsh does not control when the
threshold question is whether an EIS should have been prepared in the first instance. 37 Rather, these circuits held that
the standard of review at the threshold stage should be "reasonableness. »38
The Ninth Circuit followed the narrower approach. 39 In
Greenpeace Action v. Franklin 40 and Alaska Wilderness Recrea-

Secretary of the Army Corps of Engineers to eqjoin construction of a dam. See Marsh,
490 U.S. at 368. The organizations claimed the Corps violated NEPA by failing to
prepare a supplemental EIS to review new information. See ill. A unanimous Supreme
Court, after referencing section 706(2)(A) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5
U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1998), held that a court would only set aside such an agency decision if it was arbitrary and capricious. See Marsh, 490 U.S. at 375. Section 706(2) of
the APA provides "that a reviewing court shall (2) hold unlawful and set aside agency
action, findings, and conclusions found to be (A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law ...." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1998).
31. See Northcoast, 136 F.3d at 667.
32. See ill.
33. [d. at 666 (citing Marsh, 490 U.S. 366-67 (1989».
34. See Northcoast, 136 F.3d at 666 (citing California Trout v. Schaefer, 58 F.3d
469,473 (9th Cir. 1995».
35. See Northcoast, 136 F.3d at 666-67.
36. See ill. at 667 (citing North Buckhead Civic Ass'n v. Skinner, 903 F.2d 1533,
1538 (11th Cir. 1990».
37. See Northcoast, 136 F.3d at 666-67 (citing Goos v. I.C.C., 911 F.2d 1283, 1292
(8th Cir. 1990); Sierra Club v. Lujan, 949 F.2d 362, 367 (10th Cir. 1991).
38. See Northcoast, 136 F.3d at 667.
39. See ill.
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twn & Tourism v. Morrison;u the Ninth Circuit separated the
standard of review for factual issues from that for legal
issues. 42 The court held that agency decisions regarding factual
or technical matters, as in Marsh, are to be reviewed under the
"arbitrary and capricious" standard, while legal issues are to be
reviewed under the "reasonableness" standard. 43
The court found that NEC's claim primarily concerned "legal issues ... based on undisputed historical facts. "44 Thus, it
applied the "less deferential standard of reasonableness."411 The
court provided two underlying reasons for determining that the
Government's decision not to prepare an EIS was reasonable.
First, as the district court found, neither project was a final
agency action!6 The lack of finality not only made the court's
review difficult, but made the determination of environmental

40. 14 F.3d 1324 (9th Cir. 1992). In Greenpeace, the North Pacific Fishery Management Council issued its Fishery Management Plan and an EIS for the Gulf of
Alaska pursuant to the Fisheries Conservation Management Act. See Greenpeace
Action v. Franklin, 14 F.3d at 1327. The plan provided that the Council set annual
harvest levels of various species. See ill. Greenpeace objected to an increase in the
annual harve6t levels, claiming the increase would jeopardize a threatened species of
sea lion. See ill. at 1328-1329. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the objections turned
on factual determinations rather than legal ones. See ill. at 1331. Consequently, the
court claimed that "arbitrary and capricious" was the appropriate standard of review
for the agency's decision. See id.
41. 67 F.3d 723 (9th Cir. 1995). In Alaska Wilderness, environmentalist6 sued to
enjoin the Forest Service from offering contracts for certain timber sales on the Tongass National Forest. See Alaska Wilderness Recreation & Tourism v. Morrison, 67
F.3d at 725. The environmentalist6 believed that the Forest Service should have supplemented three EISs after a certain contract for timber had been cancelled. See ill. at
726,728. The Ninth Circuit determined that the circumstances for requiring a supplemental EIS were purely legal and applied the "reasonableness" standard of review.
See ill. at 727.
42. See Northcoast, 136 F.3d at 667.
43. See ill.
44. Id~
45. Id. at 667. Neither party objected to the underlying facts surrounding the
case, that is, the components and objectives of both projects; therefore, there was no
factual issue. See id. The legal issue was the proper classification of the projects as
-major, Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment"
requiring an EIS. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1994).
46. See Northcoast, 136 F.3d at 668. Section 704 of the Administrative Procedure
Act states that an -[a)gency action [is) made reviewable by statute and fmal agency
action.... A preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action or ruling not directly reviewable is subject to review on the review of the final agency action.- 5 U.S.C.
§ 704 (1988).
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consequences difficult for the Government as well. 47 Accordingly, because NEPA "does not require an agency to consider
the environmental effects that speculative or hypothetical projects might have on a proposed project,"48 a non~final agency
action, such as the POC Action Plan and Management Guidelines, did not require the preparation of an EIS.49
Second, the court held that even if the projects were final,
they would not require an EIS. NEPA requires an EIS "for
'every legislation and other major Federal actions significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment. mllO Both projects "set forth guidelines and goals for POC research, management strategies and information sharing" as well as "POC
preservation and timber sales. "111 Neither project had an actual
or immediate effect on the POC ecosystem as they were primarily for research. 1l2 Therefore, the court concluded that the
projects were not major federal actions./lS Further, since neither project proposed a specific activity that directly impacted
the physical environment, the projects failed to meet the last
NEPA requirement: that the projects cause a significant impact
on the quality of the human environment.1l4 Thus, the court
found the Government made a reasonable decision in not preparing an EIS.1lIl

B.

STRICKEN AGENCY DOCUMENTS

The court also resolved the minor issue of whether the district court erred in striking NEC exhibits.1l6 While the general
rule of section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act limits
judicial review of agency decisions to the administrative record,

47. See Northcoost, 136 F.3d at 668.
48. rd. (citing Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976».
49. See Northcoost, 136 F.3d at 668.
50. rd. (quoting National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §
4332(2)(C».
51. Northcoost, 136 F.3d at 670.
52. See id. at 669-70.
53. See id. at 670.
54. See id.
55. Seeid.
56. See Northcoast Environmental Center v. Glickman, 136 F.3d 680, 665 (9th Cir.
1998).
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there are exceptions. 57 A court's review may extend outside the
administrative record: "(1) if necessary to determine 'whether
the agency has considered all relevant factors and has ex-:plained its decision,' (2) 'when the agency has relied on documents not in the record,' or (3) 'when supplementing the record
is necessary to explain technical terms or complex subject matter,' and (4) 'when the plaintiffs make a showing of agency bad
faith."'58 While NEC pointed to the second exception, the Ninth
Circuit noted that since the administrative record was small,
"it certainly would have been proper for the district court to
consider Plaintiffs' exhibits. "59 The court agreed, nonetheless,
with the district court's rationale for striking the exhibits. 60
The Ninth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its
discretion by striking "cumulative and unnecessary documents
outside the administrative record," even though it would have
been proper to consider them. 61
IV.

IMPLICATIONS OF DECISION

In the Ninth Circuit, the determination as to which standard of review applies depends on whether the underlying issue is characterized as either legal or factual. Legal issues,
such as whether an EIS is required, receive a "reasonableness"
standard of review. Factual disputes, such as a rmding of no
significant impact,· are reviewed under the "arbitrary and capricious" standard. However, since the opinions in Greenpeace,
Alaska Wilderness, and Northcoast do not clearly distinguish a
legal from a factual issue, the question of which standard to
apply remains unclear.

57. See id.
58. [d. (quoting Southwest Center for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Forest Service,
100 F.3d 1443, 1450 (9th Cir. 1996».
59. Northcoast, 136 F.3d at 665.
60. See id. The district court believed it was statutorily limited to a review of the
administrative record, but that, in addition, admitting the exhibits would have been
cumulative. See id.
6!. [d.
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In Northcoast, the court stated that it assumed the issue
was legal since no facts were in dispute. 62 Thus, perhaps one
indication of the difference between factual and legal issues is
whether the parties dispute the underlying facts. 63 However,
this classification method fails to address instances where a
legal issue exists whose underlying facts are also in dispute.
The resolution of this question remains for future courts.
However, regardless of the theoretical application of the
"reasonableness" standard to legal disputes or the "arbitrary
and capricious" standard to factual disputes, the practical difference between what is "reasonable" and what is "arbitrary
and capricious" may not be that substantial. As the Supreme
Court noted in Marsh, its decision "[does] not require a substantial reworking of long established NEPA law" since several
circuit courts had already recognized that the "difference between the 'arbitrary and capricious' and 'reasonableness' standards is not of great pragmatic consequence."64

In this case, although the Ninth Circuit applied the "reasonableness" standard of review', it is questionable whether an
application of the "arbitrary and capricious" standard would
have caused a different result. The court applied the "reasonableness" standard based on its finding of a legal dispute.
Rather than evaluate the EA itself, however, the court relied
upon and deferred to the agency's determination that the projects were merely for research and had no effect upon the envi-

62. See Northcoast Environmental Center v. Glickman, 136 F.3d at 667 (9th Cir.
1998).
63. In Hells Canyon Preseroation Council v. Jacoby, 9 F. Supp. 2d 1216 (D. Or.
1998), which relied on the Northcoast decision, the court decided that the issue was
factual and therefore used the "arbitrary and capricious" standard. See id. at 1232. In
Hells Canyon, the plaintiffs challenged an agency's classification of a project as a categorical exclusion to NEPA. See id. at 1235. The classification was based on factual
determinations by the agency's experts, thus triggering the "arbitrary and capricious"
standard. See id.
64. Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360, 377 n.23 (1989).
For example, in Manasota-88, Inc. v. Thomas, 799 F.2d 687 (11th Cir. 1986), the court
said, "[als a practical matter, ... the differences between the 'reasonableness' and 'arbitrary and capricious' standards of review are often difficult to discern." Id. at 692 n.8.
Likewise, in River Road Alliance, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers of United States Army, 764
F.2d 445 (7th Cir. 1985), the court ststed, "[wle are not sure how much if any practical
difference there is between 'abuse of discretion' and 'unreasonable. m [d. at 449.
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ronment. Under the "reasonableness" standard, a court is presumed to be less deferential, and yet the court deferred to the
agency in this case. Thus, the court's decision actually weakened the distinction between the "reasonableness" and the "arbitrary and capricious" standards.

Lisa Braly·

•

Golden Gate University School of Law. Class of 2000.
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